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The Finch Effect: Evolutionary Metaphors 





 In recent years, several states in Central and Eastern Europe have seen democratic 
digression. Such illiberal resurgences came as a surprise to the many political scientists who 
assumed that the future of these states was democratic. Indeed, after the fall of the Soviet 
Union, the world largely regarded liberal democracy as the predominant system of govern-
ment. The future seemed bright, and it was tempting to understand that future in evolution-
ary terms—just as humans evolved under natural selection to become the dominant species, 
democracy had survived a similar competition and defeated all other systems of government 
to become the dominant regime. Yet, if liberal democracy had really beaten the competi-
tion back in 1989, why do self-described illiberal democracies stubbornly persist today? To 
provide a different evolutionary approach, this paper tries to understand illiberal democracy 
in Central and Eastern Europe as the differential result of the 2008 financial crisis, rather 
than as the uniform result of deep historical trends.
Keywords
 illiberal democracy, evolution, populism, financial crisis
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“There has been a temptation to assume that the conceptions of biology can be trans-
ferred to the facts of society without the need of a critical investigation of their validity 
in this new sphere… It is so very easy to say Evolution instead of saying History 
and to use a few Darwinian phrases as keys to unlock all mysteries”
David Ritchie, Darwinism and Politics 1891
 
“The state that emerges at the end of history is liberal”
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History? 1989 
1. Introduction
 In recent years, several countries in Central and Eastern Europe have digressed 
in an undemocratic manner. Such illiberal resurgences came as a surprise to many who as-
sumed that that future was democratic. Indeed, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the world 
largely regarded liberal democracy as the predominant system of government. The opinion 
wasn’t that all governments were necessarily democratic, only that they ought to be. Such 
a notion provided the European Union with a reason for enlargement; the EU ushered 
in the likes of Poland, Czechia, Hungary, and other previously undemocratic nations into 
the democratic community (Börzel, 2017). They did so under the assumption that these 
countries would one day become consolidated democracies, and the West had no reason to 
believe that this wouldn’t be the case. Although some challenged these perceptions (Jowitt, 
1992), for most, the future seemed bright. Much evidence suggested that Fukuyama was 
correct—the fight for freedom and democracy had ended and with it, so had history. 
 It was tempting to understand this democratic victory in terms of evolution—just 
as humans evolved under natural selection to become the dominant species, democracy had 
survived a similar competition and defeated all other systems of government to become the 
dominant regime. Yet we are currently observing an illiberal resurgence in the very coun-
tries the EU presumed to be heading in a liberal direction. In Hungry and Poland, leaders 
have restricted free speech and radically embraced nationalism. Additionally, countries like 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia are fostering anti-EU sentiments, and authoritarianism is 
on the rise. If liberal democracy had really beaten the competition back in 1989, why do 
self-described illiberal democracies stubbornly persist today? This is a complex puzzle with 
many possible explanations, but the best answer comes from an analysis of evolutionary 
metaphors, particularly from a biological perspective that finds democracy to be a result of 
these metaphorical processes. 
2. Extending and Refining Previous Theory 
 Evolution requires a change in the heritable characteristics of populations over 
successive generations. While it is most famous as a biological phenomenon, it is also a valu-
able approach to politics. Many other works (Eichengreen, 2018; Levitsky & Way, 2002; 
Corning, 2008; Krastev, 2012) have used evolution to explain political patterns, including 
the emergence of political regimes. While these are important works that seek to under-
stand many aspects of democracy across the world, I extend and refine one such important 
paper—Modelski and Thompson (1999)—to help describe the rise of illiberal democracy 
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in the aftermath of EU enlargement. According to 
Modelski and Thompson (1999), history is marked by changes and power struggles, which 
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make it an inherently evolutionary process. They use evolution in a broad sense to denote 
development. In this respect, they single out four basic evolutionary mechanisms that, over 
time, result in large scale changes to the global political community. These are: agenda setting, 
coalition building, macrodecisions, and execution. 
 These terms require some brief definition: agenda setting is defined as important 
events and issues that require action on a worldwide scale, not merely regional. Coalition 
building is the process by which a political system is created to address those events. Macrode-
cisions are the large-scale responses that flow from processes of both agenda setting and coali-
tion building. These usually take the form of war or other conflicts. Execution is the resulting 
global authority or major power (Modelski and Thompson, 1999, p. 125). Modelski and 
Thompson use this framework to propose an evolutionary cycle of history as seen in the top 
rows of Table 1:
Table 1: Modelski and Thompson Model
 The table illustrates general evolutionary trends that lead Modelski and Thompson 
(1999), in the final row, to make predictions about the future. These predictions operate on 
a baseline assumption that globalism and democratic integration will promote democratic 
peace and lead the macrodecision mechanism to evolve away from war and physical conflict 
into solutions based on negotiation (p. 132). In light of this, the authors state that, “the EU 
is likely to become the focus of a democratic and stable zone that is no longer a source of 
major conflagrations” and, most importantly, that liberal democracy will flourish and grow 
in many corners of the world (p. 131-138). Thus, the relatively casual and often implicit 
form of evolutionary theory made famous by Fukuyama has a counterpart in a more sophis-
ticated and long-run approach to evolution––an approach that also saw the future of liberal 
democracy as very bright. 
 As Karl Popper noted in 1961, however, “it is impossible to predict the future 
course of history.” With hindsight, we might now revise Table 1 in the following way: 
Table 2: Reformulated Modelski and Thompson Model
To fill in Modelski and Thompson’s evolutionary model, illiberal resurgence might be a 
natural choice for the current macrodecision. However, democratic integration as a coalition 
building mechanism fails to explain that pattern. While a divergence from war as a macro-
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decision may still be credible, the conjecture on the dominance of liberal democracy now 
appears to be incorrect. After all, polity scores suggest democracy has declined globally for 
twelve consecutive years (Freedom House, 2017).
 In this respect, Modelski and Thompson’s argument is remarkably similar to Fu-
kuyama’s. The former takes a far more complex evolutionary approach based on historical 
trends, but both come to the conclusion that liberal democracy is the natural political ‘win-
ner.’ Although Modelski and Thompson’s model for change provides an important basis 
for an evolutionary approach to politics, it requires extension and refinement. Following 
Ritchie, this paper shares a concern noted in the epigraph about the use of “a few Darwin-
ian phrases as keys to unlock all mysteries” (Ritchie, 1891, p. 119). To provide a different 
evolutionary approach, this paper tries to understand illiberal democracy in Central and 
Eastern Europe as the differential result of economic shocks of 2008, rather than as the uniform 
result of deep historical trends.
3. Political Evolution in Terms of Biology
 Foremost, we must correct a misconception: rather than evolution dictating a single 
genetic victor, it produces variation across species. In Darwin’s 1835 voyage to the Gala-
pagos Islands, he noticed systematic variation among finch beak sizes based upon their 
location. Birds lacking a certain polymorphism—physical characteristics that allow for the 
survival of a species due to a set of changing environmental factors—were selected out of 
the environment. Darwin determined that a single finch did not dominate over all others, 
but that finches vary according to selective pressures.
 Evolution is a result of these selective pressures and respective polymorphisms. 
In biology, selective pressures are defined as environmental conditions that place strain on 
the organisms in a given setting. Polymorphisms are the physical characteristics that certain 
animals possess or acquire that allow them to thrive in the environment despite, or because 
of a set of selective pressures. In this sense, natural selection becomes the process by which 
a particular species with a given set of polymorphism survives whereas those without it die. 
Considering the Finch example, we can refine these terms in ways that also apply to illiberal 
democracy. 
 Suppose that on a certain island in the Galapagos archipelago there are two types of 
finches; one eats only tree nuts, and the other eats only berries. The finch that eats tree nuts 
has a large beak, which allows it to crack the shells of the tree nuts they consume, whereas 
the second finch has a small beak suited for only soft berries. However, due to climate 
change, berries cease to grow on the island and the only food source left for the finches are 
tree nuts. As a result, birds with small beaks starve and eventually die out, whereas birds with 
large beaks continue to thrive and survive. Climate change and the loss of berries as a food 
source would be considered a selective pressure because it placed environmental strain on 
the finches. The beak sizes would be considered polymorphisms because they are physical 
characteristics that allowed for the survival (or not) of a certain finch. Based on the location 
of the island, the type of finches that survive may differ. This provides the basis for variation 
and is explained in the diagram below:
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Figure 1: The Evolution of Finches on the Galapagos Islands
 I use an analogous process to understand change in Central and Eastern Europe. It 
is possible that like Darwin’s finches, certain selective pressures have forced countries in that 
region to either allow their democracy to evolve or risk extinction. Extinction in this case 
might refer the collapse of institutions and the reformation of a new state. As Ritchie puts 
it, “social variation arises from external influences” (Ritchie, 1891, p. 130). These external 
influences are selective pressures that place stress on regimes. Like climate change, events 
like the 2008 economic crisis change the political environment and force organisms, or in 
this case democracies, to evolve. These selective pressures are comparable to what Modelski 
and Thompson call “agenda setting mechanisms” in the sense that they force the global 
order to change. However, approaching them in this different and biological sense is valu-
able because it allows us to consider characteristics or polymorphisms as a function of these 
pressures or shocks and not as results of history alone.
 Political polymorphisms, then, are the characteristics that allow democracy to sur-
vive under such external conditions. Like a finch’s beak, they are the features and assets a 
country has that allow them to avoid metaphorical extinction. Political success in this case is 
the consolidation of a regime and its ability to avoid institutional collapse as in the cases of 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, and even perhaps in the future, Ukraine. Various polymor-
phisms give a higher chance of regime survival but may result in ‘evolved’ democracies that 
scholars legitimately deem ‘illiberal.’ Examples of such polymorphisms may include popu-
lism, limitations of free speech, harsh immigration laws, and even decreasing democratic 
commitment. 
 The latter is especially significant. While countries are experiencing an illiberal re-
surgence as a result of selective pressures and polymorphisms like populism, it is also possible 
that they are more predisposed to such a political order than countries that are classically 
liberal. Returning to the analogy of Darwin’s finches, even though the birds with different 
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beaks may be members of the same species, they are innately and genetically different. It 
might be beneficial to think of this in terms of the well-known children’s story: The Ugly 
Duckling. In the story, a mother duck cares for all the eggs in her nest in the hopes that 
they will one day hatch into healthy ducklings. However, unbeknownst to her, one of the 
eggs is not like the others. This fact is largely undetectable to the duck until the eggs begin 
to hatch. At this point it is clear that the ugly duckling was different all along. Just as in the 
story, though the duckling was considered ugly by those who were unlike it, it surely would 
have been appreciated by those who were similar. Though deemed ugly, the reality is that 
it was merely different. 
 This analogy is useful to describe the type of variation we see for democracies in 
Europe. The EU, like the mother duck, patiently nurtured countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe in the hopes that they might one day grow to be liberal. Yet, like the ugly duckling, 
now that they have hatched, countries like Poland, Hungary, and even the Czech Repub-
lic, are revealing themselves to be composed of an entirely different genetic code. The very 
things that allow a democracy to survive certain shocks or pressures are often what force 
them to change in an illiberal manner.
 I argue that these countries are manifested variations of democracy specific to loca-
tion as a result of selective pressures and adaptive political polymorphisms that may result 
from inherent ‘genetic’ differences that stem from culture and even history, though neither 
on its own. These are difficult variables to measure, and as such this paper will not fully ex-
plore the ways in which they might influence illiberalism. Regardless, Fukuyama and other 
democratic theorists like Modelski and Thompson operate under the supposition of evolu-
tion as a result of ‘survival of the fittest’ evolutionary trends. But as George Ritchie points 
out, “The phrase ‘survival of the fittest’ is very apt to mislead for it suggests the fittest or best 
in every sense, whereas in reality it only means the survival of those best fitted to cope with 
their circumstances” (Ritchie, 1891, p. 12). As such, liberal democracy does not mark the 
“end of history” and is not a resulting global authority, but merely a variation of democracy 
as a result of certain selective pressures and polymorphisms. 
4. The Research Question 
 A number of recent scholars have described the mysterious illiberal changes in de-
mocracy in Central and Eastern Europe as an indication of democratic backsliding. Nancy 
Bermeo describes this trend as a breakdown of liberal democracies (Bermeo, 2016). As this 
point suggests, previous arguments paint the situation as black and white. Similarly, Ber-
meo, Fukuyama, and in some cases Modelski and Thompson rationalize democracy in these 
terms––either regimes are democratic, or they are not, and if they are not then they have 
failed or are in the process of doing so. Using evolution as a model for democracy in Central 
and Eastern Europe offers a different perspective. 
 When the Czech Republic joined the EU in 2004, it seemed obvious that the 
country was on a liberal course. Indeed, Czechia became the poster child for EU enlarge-
ment and the spread of liberal democracy. This is not so true anymore. Instead, the very 
features that make a democracy liberal are coming into question. The same can be said of 
Hungary. In the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, Hungary passed what is called 
the “turnover test.” This proverbial evaluation indicates that democracies are stable as a 
result of the repeated transfer of power from party to party. However, as Viktor Orban re-
tains sovereign authority, this trend is arguably diminishing. As a result, in both the Czech 
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Republic and Hungary, we observe rising democracy scores. Freedom House uses an ordi-
nal scale from 1 to 7 (1=Most Democratic, 7=Least Democratic) to measure democracy in 
almost every country. For the past 10 years, the Czech Republic has floated around a 3.00 
with a marked increase in 2009 around the time that Mirek Topolanek was appointed as 
Prime Minister. Comparatively, Hungary increased from a 2.25 in 2008 to a 4.25 in 2017 
(Freedom House, 2017). These are puzzling changes that Foa and Mounk might call signs 
of deconsolidation (Foa & Mounk, 1992). 
 For this reason, these two countries are ideal case studies that help demonstrate the 
validity of a different approach to politics from an evolutionary perspective. The increase in 
democracy scores of Czechia and Hungary largely occurred after the financial crisis of 2008. 
This makes it an excellent example of a selective pressure that clearly placed extreme strain 
on both countries. In this respect, I pose the following research question:
What are the various metaphorical polymorphisms that have contributed to the 
resurgence of illiberal democracy in both in the Czech Republic and Hungary as a 
result of the pressures introduced by the 2008 financial crisis?
 This question is politically significant. Essentially, if this comparative case study 
yields promising results, it could help form the basis of a new understanding for illiberal 
democracies everywhere. This approach may have the capacity to set precedence for future 
questions regarding different countries, selective pressures, and polymorphisms. This model 
has the potential to be applied anywhere in the world. Selective pressures and consequent 
polymorphisms exist not only in the democracies of Hungary and the Czech Republic, but 
also in Brazil, Venezuela, and even the United States. 
 In all cases, evolution applied to politics could help to explain the reasons behind 
why certain regimes persist in certain places, under certain circumstances. In this sense, it 
can help produce a political pattern that veritably measures democracy as the result of evolu-
tion. Whether we like it or not, illiberal democracies persist. As such, it is vital we begun to 
understand the patterns and puzzles that characterize these regimes. 
5. Measurement
 The 2008 financial crisis had an undeniably global impact. At the time, scholars 
argued that Hungary was the hardest hit country in the EU due to post-Soviet debts, foreign 
currency loans, and its exclusion from the Eurozone (Darvas, 2008). In reality, they were 
one of the countries in Europe to recover the fastest from the crisis. The same could be said 
of the Czech Republic. Both currently have unemployment rates below 4%, and yet both 
have become increasingly illiberal. Could these two things be correlated? 
 Since the 2008 financial crisis, Europe has seen an increase in populism and a no-
ticeable decrease in commitment to democracy, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. 
For this reason, they are ideal candidates for metaphorical polymorphisms that have contrib-
uted to the resurgence of illiberal democracy in both the Czech Republic and Hungary. I 
define my variables as: 
 Independent Variables
 Commitment to Democracy
 Populism
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 Dependent Variable
 Degree of Illiberal Democracy
 How does one measure populism or commitment to democracy? Kirk Hawkins 
uses survey-based data to rank countries on an incremental populist scale. His data is founded 
on both the analysis of written government documents and speeches given by various gov-
ernment leaders (Hawkins et al., 2012). According to an article published by The Guardian, 
“[e]ach leader was given an average populism score, based on the extent to which speeches 
contained populist ideas. The data pinpoints populist discourse by leaders in all the largest 
countries in Europe and the Americas, as well as India. Researchers graded their speeches 
on a 0-2 scale, ranging from not populist to very populist” (Lewis et al., 2019). This type 
of system for measuring populism has proved to be very effective. It works well within an 
evolutionary model because it singles out elected leaders as examples of populism. If popu-
lism is a characteristic of democracy that has arisen as a result of the 2008 financial crisis, it 
is possible to assume that a state has become more illiberal in the process of “evolutionary” 
survival or extinction.
 Commitment to democracy is similar in that it is a characteristic predictive of il-
liberalism and arises in times of external pressures like the 2008 financial crisis. However, 
like the ugly (or at least different) duckling, it may also be an innate characteristic of each 
country. In both cases it tends to produce illiberal democracy. Various opinion polls have 
sampled citizens in Hungary and the Czech Republic in order to measure commitments 
to democracy in those countries. Using these polls, we will be able to understand how this 
variable has influenced stability and illiberalism in these countries after the 2008 financial 
crisis. 
 Some might say that these two measures are the same, that illiberalism by default 
suggests that a country will be less committed to democracy or have a propensity towards 
populism. There are several reasons why these assumptions, though understandable, do not 
apply. First, academic literature makes the argument that liberal democracy naturally results 
in populism. Consolidated democracies also experience populist movements that threaten 
many tenets of liberalism and yet, as in the case of the United States, democratic institutions 
do not collapse, and rights do not disappear. Furthermore, countries that are far from de-
mocracy, like China and North Korea, do not experience populism in the same threatening 
way that many liberal democracies do. In essence, populism can lead to illiberal democracy, 
but rarely does illiberal democracy lead to populism. 
 Second, not all countries with low levels of democratic commitment experience 
illiberal shifts. Citizens of countries can lack democratic commitment, yet the democratic 
institutions themselves remain in place; a country does not become illiberal only if its people 
are. However, low institutional commitment to democracy may be synonymous with il-
liberal democracy. In this case, the government itself ceases to act in a democratic manner 
and the institutions either evolve or collapse. This is the dependent variable, whereas the 
factors that contribute to this result are the independent variables which I have defined as 
public commitment to democracy and populism. For the purposes of this paper, public 
commitment to democracy will be expressed only as commitment to democracy, and lack 
of institutional commitment to democracy will be understood only as illiberal democracy. 
This is an important distinction and provides the foundation for this theoretical approach.
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6. Theoretical Expectation
 The Czech Republic and Hungary are remarkably similar in many ways, which is 
why they are very good case studies for this project. However, as was previously mentioned, 
Hungary has a higher democracy score. For this reason, I am anticipating that Hungary is 
more illiberal and as such has a lower commitment to democracy, and a higher populism 
score. If this is the case, then these metaphorical polymorphisms may have allowed Hungary 
to survive but have also left their dedication to liberalism in question. Regardless, the same 
could be true of the Czech Republic. This variance in levels of populism and commitment 
to democracy provides the framework for an evolutionary approach to politics. Depending 
on which variable is strongest in each country, we can make tentative conclusions about the 
way democracies form using such a model.   
7. Findings
7.1.  The situation in the Czech Republic. 
 At the height of the 2008 financial crisis when markets plummeted across the 
globe, many countries turned to strong leaders that took on classically populist rhetoric in 
order to confront the economic issues that were plaguing their country. The Czech Re-
public was no exception. In 2009 Mirek Topolanek was appointed to the position of prime 
minister, and the same year, their democracy score jumped from 2.25 to 3. On an ordinal 
scale from 1 to 7 (1=Most Democratic, 7=Least Democratic), this means that the Czech 
Republic’s institutions became significantly less liberal as their score increased. Perhaps this 
loss in democratic values can be accounted for by populism and commitment to democracy 
as characteristics that allowed for survival but forced change in an illiberal direction. 
 According the Hawkins’ populist measurement, Mirek Topolanek received an av-
erage score of 1 for the four years he was in office. This suggests that he sits in between 
what the research calls ‘somewhat populist’ and ‘populist’. For comparison purposes, Hugo 
Chavez received nearly a 2 on the same scale, which would suggest that he is ‘very populist’. 
Although Prime Minister Topolanek never reached the same level of populism as Chavez, 
his score hovered around 1 during his term, which indicates an important populist shift that 
took place in the years directly following the financial crisis. 
 These changes did not affect the Czech Republic’s commitment to democracy. 
In 2009, Pew Research Center conducted a survey with the intent to understand attitudes 
about democracy in various countries in Central and Eastern Europe. They found that 81% 
of Czechs felt that a democratic government was better suited to solve the problems their 
country was facing than a strong leader. Furthermore, roughly six-in-ten Czechs (61%) 
agreed with the statement that “voting gives people like me some say about how the gov-
ernment runs things.” Indeed, enthusiasm for the liberally democratic direction politics have 
taken since 1989 is widespread in the Czech Republic (Pew Research, 2010). A country re-
port published by BTI in 2008 illustrates a similar trend; according to their research, “Most 
citizens support democratic institutions and no important groups seek to change the Czech 
political system” (BTI 2008). These findings are summarized in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Commitment to Democracy in Czech Republic
 Given the rise in democracy scores at the onset of the economic crisis, it is par-
ticularly intriguing that the Czech Republic’s commitment to democracy did not falter, yet 
their institutions appeared to become less liberal. Perhaps in the Czech Republic, commit-
ment to democracy was a characteristic that allowed for regime survival, but unlike popu-
lism, did not contribute change in an illiberal direction during the years directly following 
the 2008 financial crisis. To sum it up, Czechia’s commitment to democracy remained 
strong despite economic and political turbulence that may have suggested otherwise. How-
ever, recent political changes seem to be shifting the conversation. 
 The election of President Zeman and appointment of Andrej Babis to the office 
of Prime Minister have taken the country in an unprecedented illiberal direction. While 
Hawkins’ team of experts has not yet compiled a populism score for either of these leaders, 
it is clear that they have incited change within the Czech Republic. Babis’ party, ANO, 
stands for “Action of Dissatisfied Citizens,” which rings of populist rhetoric. Similarly, he 
has positioned himself as an anti-politics politician, frequently criticizing older, established 
parties for alleged corruption and ineptitude while basing his support on a “people’s plat-
form” (Smith, 2017). According to BTI, the Czech Republic’s commitment to democracy 
is on the decline (BTI, 2018). This is perplexing because it suggests that commitment to 
democracy today is weaker than it was 8 years ago at the height of the economic crisis. 
Perhaps the Czech Republic is being subject to new selective pressures and polymorphisms, 
which are leading to this change. 
7.2.  The situation in Hungary.
 Just as the Czech Republic turned to Mirek Topolanek, Hungary turned to Viktor 
Orbán. Using populist rhetoric has his ally, Viktor Orbán declared in 2014 that “democracy 
is not necessarily liberal” (Tóth, 2014). Hungary would be ushering in a new era of illib-
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eralism with Viktor Orbán at the forefront. While to some these statements may come as a 
surprise, the reality lies more within the bounds of evolution.
 On Hawkins’ populist scale, Viktor Orbán received close to a 1 during both of his 
terms as Prime Minister. Like Topolanek, this places him in between ‘somewhat populist’ 
and ‘populist’. As such, the Czech Republic and Hungary are very similar in this way. Both 
countries responded to crisis with populism as a means of maintaining survival. However, 
it is clear that Hungary is far more illiberal, even to the extent that they identify as such. 
Orbán’s rhetoric responds particularly to immigration and EU policy as issues of sovereignty 
while also cultivating a close relationship with Russia (Hawkins et al., 2012). These findings 
are summarized in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Populism in the Czech Republic and Hungary
 In light of this, it is no surprise that Hungary’s commitment to democracy is sig-
nificantly lower than that of the Czech Republic. According to another study conducted by 
Pew Research, 53% of the population in Hungary is unsatisfied with democracy. Similarly, 
only 18% of citizens in Hungary are committed to democratic institutions. In comparison, 
60% are not committed and more than 15% prefer undemocratic governments (Wike et al. 
2017). This means that there is almost an equal number of people who are committed to 
democracy as there are people who prefer undemocratic alternatives. Furthermore, of all the 
countries in the study, Hungary was the most financially stable with the least commitment 
to democracy. Its economic counterparts include the likes of South Korea, Canada, and 
Australia. Yet Hungary’s commitment to democracy remains consistently lower. 
 This comes as no surprise given the popularity of Viktor Orbán and Fidesz with 
the people of Hungary. Like the ugly (or at least different) duckling, Hungary is revealing 
itself to be ‘genetically’ different. Just as the mother duck mistakenly perceived each one 
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of her ducklings to be the same, perhaps the EU has made a similar error with Hungary: 
oblivious to its inherent dissimilarity until now. In any case, populism and commitment to 
democracy appear to be characteristics that have resulted in survival but have also contrib-
uted to an illiberal change. These two things help explain why Hungary’s democracy score 
might be higher than the Czech Republic’s. These findings are summarized in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Commitment to Democracy in Hungary
8. What does this mean in the context of evolution?
 Where populism appears to be consistent in both countries, Hungary’s commit-
ment to democracy is strikingly lower than that of Czechia. Though it is clear that the 
degree of illiberalism is different in these two countries, these measures provide a new ex-
planation.
 Just as the bird with a small beak was selected out of the environment on a certain 
island, liberal democracy was selected out of the environment in Hungary. The findings 
indicate that this could be because of two things: populism and commitment to democracy. 
Additionally, just as climate change effected the food source of the birds, the 2008 finan-
cial crisis threatened the stability of the country. According to an article published by The 
Guardian, “Hungary was the hardest hit of the central European EU members because so 
much of its massive government debt was foreign-owned. These foreigners wanted to sell 
their Hungarian forint-denominated bonds, but no new buyers appeared on the market” 
(Darvas, 2008). As a result, the economic and political legitimacy of the government was 
called into question and the future of the regime at the time was uncertain. It is no surprise 
that only two years later Viktor Orbán was appointed as Prime Minister. Like the beak of 
the bird, populism and commitment to democracy allowed for Hungary to survive despite 
that detrimental pressure. Unfortunately, these characteristics also contributed to the resur-
gence of illiberal democracy as a residual effect. 
 If this is the case, why hasn’t illiberal democracy disappeared now that Hungary’s 
economy is thriving? In this context, it might be because commitment to democracy is a 
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polymorphism that is not just a result of external pressure like populism is, but also an innate 
aspect of Hungary’s political climate. Just as the ugly duckling was not a duckling to begin 
with, neither was Hungary ever truly liberal. The type of democracy we see in that country 
today is a result of this and other metaphorical polymorphisms that arise as a consequence of 
certain selective pressures. 
 Comparatively, the Czech Republic has not been affected the same way but is 
noticeably slipping into illiberal habits (Hanley & Vachudova, 2018). Although Mirek To-
polanek’s populism score is fairly high, the country is still committed to democracy, though 
that is noticeably decreasing following Andrej Babis and his political front known as ANO 
(Action of Dissatisfied Citizens). This might suggest that commitment to democracy is not 
a polymorphism that the Czech Republic possesses. Perhaps the Czech Republic is not an 
ugly duckling but is actually innately liberal in ways that Hungary is not. In this respect, it 
is likely a characteristic that contributes to survival, but in a liberal manner rather than an 
illiberal one. Nonetheless, while Czechia may genetically be a duck, they are certainly get-
ting uglier. With the government in the hands of Zeman and Babis, liberal democracy in 
the Czech Republic is taking a turn for the worse.
 On the other hand, populism is a characteristic that contributes to the survival of 
the Czech Republic in an illiberal manner. Mirek Topolanek, Milos Zeman, and Andrej 
Babis are leaders that have changed the political climate of the Czech Republic in signifi-
cantly populist and arguably illiberal ways. After the 2008 financial crisis, like many other 
countries, Czechia turned to strong populist leaders in order to maintain control. But in the 
process of doing so, it has become undoubtedly less liberal. Perhaps a similar procedure is 
taking place today with Zeman and Babis as a result of immigration or other selective pres-
sures.  
 If we were to approach these findings in the same way as Modelski and Thomp-
son (1999), we might attribute the resurgence of illiberal democracy as the resulting global 
authority to various macro-level events like the 2008 financial crisis. However, not all 
countries have become illiberal, and it is becoming increasingly more evident that not all 
countries are on a path to become liberal. In a global world the answer lies not in “survival of 
the fittest” but in variation. These findings demonstrate that fact and describe the immense 
variation we observe. In both the case of Hungary and the case of the Czech Republic, an 
evolutionary model fits the direction that both countries have gone. If this is the case of two 
countries that are remarkably similar, it might be even more true of countries that are vastly 
different. Further investigation is warranted. 
9. Epistemological Concerns
 Evolutionary theories inherently suggest that behavior of any sort is a product of 
environmental and genetic factors rather than agentic based decisions. As such, this approach 
could be interpreted as not only reductionistic, but also deterministic. These are dangerous 
assumptions. Political actors and the choices they make are imperative to any political sys-
tem. These choices can be made by interest groups, voters, members of the legislature, and 
even executive authorities. In all cases, the decisions they make produce different outcomes. 
In Hungary, voters could have chosen not to elect Fidesz as the majority party in parliament 
(but they did). Parliament could have chosen not to appoint Viktor Orbán as Prime Minister 
(but it did). Viktor Orbán could have chosen not to lead Hungary in an illiberal direction 
(but he did). Indeed, in another world, Hungary might have been the Germany of Central 
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and Eastern Europe. Certainly, the EU wishes it were so. 
 Choices are significant to say the least, but why do people make the choices that 
they do? To say that people are free to choose as they wish is equally as wrong as saying that 
the future is determined by evolution. Both the EU and Fukuyama made the same mistake; 
choice exists but is limited by circumstance –– circumstances that may be classified as both 
selective pressures and polymorphisms. In essence, just as ducks can never be swans, some 
democracies may never be liberal. The choices that they make are predicated on this genetic 
disposition and the external forces that place stress on a certain regime. 
10. Conclusion
 At the onset of the 21st century it seemed like Fukuyama was correct, that the 
end of history really was liberal. But that was before 9/11, before the 2008 Financial Crisis, 
before EU Enlargement, before the refugee crisis, and before the election of leaders like 
Donald Trump to heads of state across the world. The truth is that we can’t predict the 
future, but we can experiment with suggestive analogies that help us think about the future 
in the context of the past and the present. What this paper demonstrates is the viability of 
a new approach to understanding the resurgence of illiberal democracies across the world 
using biological evolution as a model. 
 Populism and commitment to democracy are just two things that might explain 
why the Czech Republic and Hungary are experiencing the democratic shift that they 
are. Though many countries across Central and Eastern Europe share similar origins, their 
implementation—or lack of—liberal democracy is by no means the same. The key to an-
swering the age-old question, why?, lies in the concept, presented in this paper, of evolu-
tion. Liberal democracy has, in the case of Hungary, been selected out of the environment 
as a result of the country’s waning commitment to democracy and increased presence of 
populism. This differs from the Czech Republic, which has also adopted populist ideolo-
gies while maintaining a higher level of commitment to democracy. The explanation for 
variation in liberal democracy for these two countries lies in the conflicting commitment to 
democracy that each country has. 
 This analogy takes the form of a finch, but just as the physical world is filled with 
different species of birds and animals, so is the political world filled with different regimes 
and democracies. To recall a quote from David Ritchie, “The phrase ‘survival of the fittest’ 
is very apt to mislead for it suggests the fittest or best in every sense, whereas in reality it 
only means the survival of those best fitted to cope with their circumstances” (Ritchie 1891, 
12). The democracies in the Czech Republic and Hungary have adapted and made choices 
based on their circumstances, and as a result have evolved in an illiberal manner. The same 
can be said of countries everywhere. We must understand this in order to make sense of the 
future, but in no way can we ever predict it.
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